

LC

493

E6B7

COPY 2



Class LC 493

Book .E6 B7

Copied

R. Rathbun

Brocnahan

President Eliot . . .

and

Jesuit Colleges . .



REVIEW PUBLISHING CO
194 WASHINGTON ST
BOSTON, MASS



President Eliot . . .

and

Jesuit Colleges . .



BY THE
REVEREND TIMOTHY BROSNAHAN, S.J.
WOODSTOCK COLLEGE
WOODSTOCK, MD.

c 1900

copy 2

LC493
E6B7
copy 2

By Transfer
U. S. Office of Education
NOV 17 1938

EXTRACTS
FROM AN IMPORTANT EDITORIAL IN THE
“SACRED HEART REVIEW,”

January 13, 1900.

“The scholarly paper of the Rev. Timothy Brosnahan, of Woodstock, Md., which appears this week in the REVIEW, and which, as the reader will see, constitutes a categorical, comprehensive, yet very conservative refutation of certain statements embodied in an article that President Eliot of Harvard University contributed to the last October number of the *Atlantic Monthly*, was offered by its author to that publication, which declined it on the ground that it could not open its pages to controversy. Inasmuch as the *Atlantic Monthly*, in its December issue, printed a paper from the pen of Andrew F. West of Princeton University, “Is There a Democracy of Studies?”, in which the New Jersey professor took exceptions to, and controverted very effectively, and even less conservatively than Father Brosnahan does in his article, the leading statements of President Eliot’s October paper, the *Atlantic’s* reason for declining the Jesuit’s contribution seems strangely inconsistent and rather disingenuous.

*

o

*

*

*

“It is not at all easy to understand why President Eliot should publicly stultify himself in the way he has done in this issue. There are those having the means of knowing who say that for years back the head of Harvard University has systematically labored by every means in his control, to bring about a condition which would compel all Catholic young men in this section of the country who are desirous of a college education to go to Harvard for it. And certainly the marked manner wherein, in his October article, he singles out the Jesuit schools as special objects of his unwarranted and unfounded charges lend color to that statement. Can it be possible that the *Atlantic Monthly*, in permitting Professor West to defend Protestant institutions from President Eliot's allegations and in refusing to allow Father Brosnahan to repel his more direct accusations against Jesuit colleges, has joined hands with Harvard's president in his crusade against Catholic classic institutes here in New England?”

Ms. A. 9. 2. 7. 3. 7

President Eliot and Jesuit Colleges.

A Defence.

I.

Mr. Charles W. Eliot, President of Harvard University, published some time ago in the *Atlantic Monthly*, an article advocating the extension of his elective system to secondary or high schools. Before dismissing his subject he saw fit to transgress the proper scope of his paper, as indicated by its title, in order to express his views on Moslem and Jesuit Colleges. What peculiar association of ideas is responsible for the yoking of Moslems and Jesuits in the same educational category it would be unprofitable to inquire, since it is a question of merely personal psychology. The present writer, having no brief for the Moslems, is concerned only with the strictures on the Jesuit system. These he thinks are unfounded, singularly inexact, and merit attention solely from the fact that they are the pronouncements of a man standing high in his profession.

The convictions of one holding the position of the President of Harvard University will naturally carry weight in educational matters. President Eliot

has been at the head of one of our most prominent universities for over thirty years. It is no doubt due largely to his executive ability that the institution which he has governed so long has been so successful financially, and received that organization to which it owes, in part at least, its present popularity. It will be presumed therefore that he has made himself acquainted with a system of education which he thinks proper to criticize publicly. It will scarcely be expected that an educator of his prominence would thoughtlessly, or under the stress of any undue feeling, commit himself in a magazine article to adverse comments on a system which he did not deem worth his study.

President Eliot's estimate of the Jesuit system is expressed in the following passage in his paper: "There are those who say that there should be no election of studies in secondary schools. . . . This is precisely the method followed in Moslem countries, where the Koran* prescribes the perfect education to be administered to all children alike. The prescription begins in the primary schools

*Though not directly bearing on the issue met by the present paper, it would nevertheless, for the sake of erudition, interest many to have President Eliot cite or at least give references to the passages of the Koran where this comprehensive prescription of studies is found.

and extends straight through the university; and almost the only mental power cultivated is memory. Another instance of uniform prescribed education may be found in the curriculum of the Jesuit Colleges, which has remained almost unchanged for four hundred years, disregarding some trifling concessions to natural sciences. That these examples are both ecclesiastical is not without significance. Nothing but an unhesitating belief in the divine wisdom of such prescriptions can justify them; for no human wisdom is equal to contriving a prescribed course of study equally good for even two children of the same family between the ages of eight and eighteen. Direct revelation from on high would be the only satisfactory basis for a uniform prescribed school curriculum. The immense deepening and expanding of human knowledge in the nineteenth century, and the increasing sense of the sanctity of the individual's gifts and will-power have made uniform prescriptions of study in secondary schools impossible and absurd."

Aside from the derogatory insinuations contained in this passage, the average reader will carry away from the perusal of it two main assertions: (1) that the Jesuit system of education implies a uniform prescribed curriculum of Moslem-like rigidity; (2) that the natural dis-

parity of the individual student in gifts and will-power, the finite wisdom of the educator, and the increase of human knowledge are such as to necessitate the widest application of the elective system,

The first proposition enunciates what is claimed to be a fact, the second asserts a theory. These propositions, as we shall see, are extreme, and certainly not correlative. The negation of one does not infer the other. But in the truth of either the Jesuit system is condemned, not necessarily as a system of education, but as a system adapted to modern requirements. If the Jesuit system is as rigid in its prescribed matter as the system attributed to the Moslem, then it has failed to keep up with the modern development of knowledge, and to utilize modern sciences that possess educational values. If on the other hand all uniform prescriptions of study are "absurd and impossible," if no two individuals even of the same family can be submitted to the same uniform course of study, if only unlimited "electivism" is wise and possible, then undoubtedly the Jesuit system, and the system of many colleges wholly independent of the Jesuits, are condemned. In fact, if the principles of "electivism" must be applied to the education of every child of eight years and upward, it looks as if the President of Harvard had rung the death knell of all

system, not only for colleges and high schools, but for primary schools as well ; and we shall yet witness the exhilarating spectacle of " tots " of eight or ten years of age gravely electing their courses under the guidance, or rather with the approval of their nurses.

The state of the question as regards Jesuit Colleges may be clearer, if attention is directed to a distinction which the present General of the Society of Jesus thought it advisable to emphasize in an address delivered by him at Exaeten in Holland on January 1, 1893. He warns his hearers not to confound the Jesuit *method* of studies with the *matter* to which that method is applied. For the first he claimed stability, to the second he conceded change. The distinction is, of course, obvious, but not necessarily always present to those who discuss Jesuit or other systems of education. Now, I understand President Eliot to disapprove of our method in so far as he advocates the elective system of Harvard, and to maintain that, even in the subjects studied, the Jesuit system has adhered to the curriculum of four hundred years ago, excepting some slight concession to the natural sciences.

There is one way and only one way of investigating the truth of this last assertion. It is purely a question of facts. The records are published. He who

runs may read. In the second, fifth, ninth, and sixteenth volumes of the *Monumenta Pædagogica Germaniæ* the history of the formation and growth of the Jesuit system, finally embodied authoritatively in the *Ratio Studiorum* of 1599, is given in all its details. One who wishes to find the facts need only contrast the studies indicated by the old *Ratio Studiorum* with the studies taught to-day in the various colleges of the Jesuits in various countries. One has only to compare, for instance, the program of studies at Georgetown College in Washington, at Stonyhurst College in England, at Feldkirch in Austria, at Kalocsa in Hungary, at Beyrouth in Syria, at the Ateneo Municipal in Manila, at Zi-ka-wei in China, in order to get a general, yet a fair idea, of the studies pursued in the Jesuit Colleges of to-day. By contrasting the courses employed in these colleges with those employed in the seventeenth century we may decide the question of fact. Whether our recent critic made an investigation of this kind or something equivalent I have no means of knowing. He gives us no intimation of the grounds on which he builds his statements. He simply asserts, with authoritative confidence and in a tone of finality, that for four hundred years there has been practically no change

in the curriculum of studies in Jesuit Colleges. He may have thought the expenditure of time required to find the facts would be ill-repaid by the results ; and in so thinking he may or may not be right. But in case he looked upon it as an unconscionable waste of time to explore the arid wastes of the Koran or the *Ratio Studiorum*, being an educated man, and having an educated man's dislike for facts that are constructed out of fancy, he might with decorum have abstained from all positive statement on the matter.

The bare facts are these. In the Jesuit schools of the seventeenth century the classes, which corresponded to the college* classes of Jesuit schools to-day, were the three higher classes of the Gymnasium, with one class from the Lyceum, viz., *Suprema Grammatica*, *Humanitas*, *Rhetorica* and *Philosophia*. These classes, except the first two, were not necessarily each to be completed in one year ; though it is the aim of the system in this country, when applied to diligent students, to have the courses, at least of the first three classes, finished in three years. The course of Philosophy may sometimes be extended beyond a year. The studies of the first three classes, by the *Ratio* of 1599, were the Latin and Greek languages and litera-

*I use the word "College" in the sense which attaches to it in this country.

ture. The preparatory studies for these classes were made in the Grammar classes, corresponding in some respects to our modern Latin high school. The student entering the class of *Suprema Grammatica*, was reasonably familiar with the Latin and Greek languages, was able to read these languages, and to write Latin correctly, idiomatically and with some degree of ease. The purpose of his studies thereafter was to acquire the mental training and culture that came from an intelligent study of his authors as literature. The scope of the classes is indicated by the technical terms by which they are designated. In the judgment of those who planned the courses of 1599, that scope could be best attained by using the classic languages—at that time almost the only available instruments of college education. It is true, that in these classes, there were collateral studies—called *eruditio* in the *Ratio*—comprising the historical, geographical, ethnographical, critical, or other learning required to use the author read in accordance with the scope of the class. The character of the class was determined, however, not by the authors read, but rather the authors were selected in keeping with the purpose of the class. In this connection, it may not be out of place to note a fallacy which the writer from personal experi-

ence knows to obtain in places where one would judge it little likely to be found. The fallacy consists in measuring the grade of a class in a college course, by the author studied in that class. A mistake of this kind would indicate a very confused notion of educational ends. It ought to be quite clear that Caesar's Commentaries, for instance, studied in the first year of a high school, for the purpose of acquiring a Latin vocabulary, and a knowledge of Latin construction and idiom, is a vastly different thing from the study of the same Commentary by a body of young men, familiar with the Latin language and of some maturity of mind, in order to acquire a knowledge of historical style; that Homer's Iliad, studied by the high-school boy with one eye fixed on grammar and dictionary, is another book from that same Iliad, when read by a college student, in order to feel its epic power. Yet, undoubtedly, any one acquainted with the mechanical way of measuring class grades which is widely prevalent, at least in certain parts of this country, must confess that even those, who by their position ought to know the purpose of education, will attempt to determine a student's grade by the author he studied, and not by the end he had in view when studying that author, the method of studying, and the

consequent mental results.* The scope of these three classes, therefore, is a distinct thing from the studies, or authors, which the Jesuit educators of the seventeenth century used to attain their end. Keeping these precautionary remarks in view, it is admitted that the twenty-five hours a week, constituting the class work of Jesuit schools in the seventeenth century, were practically devoted to the exclusive study of Latin and Greek.

With these twenty-five hours a week employed in the studies of Latin and Greek, let us contrast the studies and hours in the Jesuit College of to-day. For brevity's sake I take one American college. Georgetown University in its Collegiate Department exacts twenty-seven and a half hours a week of class work from every student who is a candidate for a college degree. But instead of one hundred per cent. of this time being

*The same lamentable confusion is manifested regarding the natural sciences. Physics, for instance, is taught in some of our high schools before the boys know even geometry. The result is not scientific education, but conceit. It is true some so-called laboratory practice is annexed. But in so far as any training of the mind in science, in inductive reasoning, in synthesis, and the faculty of observation is effected, the whole thing bears about the same relation to the teaching of science, that catechism does to theology.

given to Latin and Greek as in the schools of the seventeenth century, only about fifty-three per cent. is given to those studies to-day. Three hundred years later, then, forty-seven per cent. of class time is conceded to modern studies. Evidently there has been some change in the last "four hundred years," for nearly half of the class time has been wrested from the domain of Latin and Greek. This time is proportioned during four years to the study of English, mathematics, modern languages and natural sciences; specifically, three hours a week, exclusive of laboratory work, are assigned during the Sophomore and Junior years to natural sciences and eight hours a week during the Senior year. These facts are not difficult to obtain. Similar data may be had regarding the class hours in other Jesuit colleges. In view of them I shall permit the reader to surmise on what ground the declaration is made, that "another instance of uniform prescribed education may be found in the curriculum of Jesuit colleges, which has remained *almost unchanged for four hundred years*, disregarding some *trifling* concessions to *natural sciences*."*

Considering the scope of a college education, as distinct from university

*The italics are the present writer's.

study; if we measure the concessions made to natural sciences by the time given, by the maturity of mind brought to the study of them, I believe these periods devoted to the natural sciences are in excess of the amount required for graduation in most colleges. Every one knows that a young man may graduate and receive a college degree from Harvard without having given any time whatsoever during his four years to the study of the natural sciences. And it would seem that in such cases Harvard has made no concession at all, either trifling or important, to natural sciences.

This suggests an old fallacy apparently underlying the strictures on Jesuit Colleges—the confounding of the number of studies taught by a given college and the number which the individual student must complete before he is declared a Bachelor of Arts. In the first sense Harvard has made large concessions to natural sciences; in the second, it has made large concessions to individual students—the concessions to let all science largely alone. If a college is distinguished from a university in this, that a college gives “a systematic discipline in liberal studies”*—and this distinction has not as yet become obsolete—

*Johns Hopkins Register, 1888-89, p. 145.

then the value of a college curriculum ought to be settled by its application to the student, and not by vast programs announcing a multiplicity of studies which the student is at liberty to neglect. No wise man will estimate the value of a student's degree by this program, but by the studies which in fact the student does elect and master. And it is evident that that degree varies in significance to such an extent as to render it almost meaningless. It is a fact, however, that the unobservant, not necessarily the uneducated, judge the educational standard of a college by these elaborate programs, and not by the minute parts which the candidate for a degree undertakes to study. It would be very interesting to know, but it is difficult to discover, what courses the main body of students do actually elect in colleges in which studies are elective; what percentage of those who obtain a degree, do so on what they irreverently call "snap" courses. Until we have this information in detail, it is useless to write of "trifling concessions to the natural sciences," or in fact to any other sciences.

"Four hundred years" is, it seems to me, another misleading phrase in the criticism I am examining. "Four hundred years of unchanged uniformity" has an impressive sound in this mutable age when progress is in danger of being

identified with change.* We must first note that the expanding of knowledge—whatever may be said of its deepening—the growth and differentiation of sciences are of recent development. Consequently it may be safely asserted that up to about forty years ago the curricula of all colleges were substantially in accord with that elaborated by the Jesuits during the two hundred years that preceded their suppression in 1773.

It is quite clear that the old curriculum could not have made use of instruments of education not yet invented. If the old program was retained, the reason evidently was that there was no new developed and coördinated body of learning or science to supplant it, or to claim equal rights with it. As soon as a new science was recognized to have reached a stage of coherency that gave it an educational value, we find that it was introduced into the curricula of nearly all our American colleges. But a complete change from the uniform described course is a policy of recent date. Until the school year of 1872-1873 there were prescribed studies for each of the four

* There is some arithmetical confusion here, which I notice merely to dismiss it. The Jesuit Order was instituted in the year 1540, three hundred and fifty-nine years ago. The Jesuit method of studies was not fixed until 1599. The difference between 1599 and 1899 is three hundred.

college years at Harvard. About that time it was discovered that no "human wisdom was equal to contriving a prescribed course of study equally good" for all Seniors. Thereafter this conviction gradually grew in extension until it comprehended at successive intervals the Junior, Sophomore and Freshman years. About fifteen years ago, then, after two centuries and a half of successful work in the field of education, Harvard recognized that "direct revelation from on high would be the only satisfactory basis for a prescribed school curriculum," and the present elective system that characterizes that institution was finally introduced. Fifteen years is a very short time in the history of an educational movement, yet within that brief span of years the elective system has become to its advocates an educational fetich, which who-so does not reverence is deserving of anathema. Nevertheless, it would be too much to expect that it should have been adopted before it was invented. In so far, therefore, as it is a reproach to Jesuit Colleges not to have accepted that system, the "four hundred years" dwindle to fifteen. It would consequently have been more exact, though less telling, to have said that: For the last fifteen years the curriculum of Jesuit Colleges has remained practically unchanged.

I am not citing these facts in praise or

blame of either class of institutions. Nor am I claiming or denying or conceding a higher educational efficiency for the new program than for the old. There were brave men before Agamemnon. There were educated men graduated from Harvard before the advent of the system at present there in vogue. The number of graduates annually was not so large then as now. But it would certainly be folly to intimate that the old system did not produce proportionately as large a percentage of men, who in the very best sense of the word were educated scholars. In like manner the old program of the Jesuit Colleges did somehow, in spite of its alleged disregard for the "sanctity of the individual's gifts and will-power," and without "a direct revelation from on high," result in giving to the world trained, cultured, and investigating minds. None of this concerns the issue I have raised, or rather attempted to meet. My contention deals exclusively with facts. I have endeavored to show that these facts are other than those proclaimed; that the Jesuit curriculum has not remained unchanged for four hundred years; that its concessions to natural sciences are not trifling; that even as a recalcitrant against the wisdom of Harvard's elective system these four hundred years "writ" small mean at the most fifteen.

II.

But let us turn to the method of Jesuit education. It undoubtedly has remained unchanged for the last three hundred years. Do the exigencies of modern education call for its rejection in favor of the elective system of Harvard? Will anything short of "an unhesitating belief in the Divine wisdom" of its prescriptions justify non-compliance with this call? Aside from a "direct revelation from on high" can any satisfactory basis be found for it?

About forty years ago a new problem began to present itself to educators. Human knowledge in certain lines had widened marvelously. New sciences sprang into being, old ones grew in amplitude and extent, until no longer possessing a cohesive centre, they burst into a number of distinct and specific sciences. Coincident with this increase and multiplication of sciences, man's intellectual sympathies, interests, and bents varied and widened in range. President Eliot's premises began to confront every one on whom the direction of an institution of higher education devolved. "The immense deepening and expanding of human knowledge in the nineteenth century and the increasing sense of the sanctity of the individual's gifts and will-power" rendered the old

solution of the problem inadequate on its practical side. The old solution had, it is true, the merit of unity, but the new problem demanded a fuller recognition of individuality. The difficulty that perplexed educators was to combine the principle of unity and the principle of individuality. The various departments of human knowledge had become so manifold that it was utterly impossible for any one mind to master them all. An attempt to do so even partially would have resulted in mental dissipation and loss of power. On the other hand awakened interests and broader outlooks would not be cramped within the precincts of the old curriculum. Some modification was therefore necessary.

It was possible, of course, to ignore either of these two principles by fixing one's mind so exclusively on the other as to exaggerate it out of all due proportion. One might adhere to a rigid unity on existing lines, or one might give free rein to individuality. One might, from an educational point of view, look on the learning of the century as a vast "sphere having its circumference everywhere and its centre nowhere;" or one might retain a centre and the old circumference, and doggedly refuse to enlarge one's horizon. Either solution of the problem would be extreme. The first, among a people feeling the thrill of new intel-

lectual life and the exaltation of widening intellectual vistas, would probably for a time meet with more general popularity. As usual in a transitional era the pendulum would swing from extreme conservatism to extreme liberalism. Not all would distinguish between the lifeless unity of a crystal and the living unity of an oak, which, unchanged in kind, varies within its species in different environments of climate, soil, and cultivation. A sane conservatism and a wise liberalism would run the risk of being dubbed antiquated, retrograde, reactionary.

The problem is not easy of solution. That solution will necessarily be the outcome of years of thought and experience. The selection from such a mass of educational matter, and the coördination of the same to definite educational ends is not to be effected by *a priori* theories, and exaggerated rhetoric on the sanctity of one principle to the exclusion of the other; nor by sweeping indictments of those whose heresy does not happen to be our heresy. There may be a medium between the alternatives of rigid uniformity and extreme "electivism," and it may be possible to discover that medium without the immediate and direct interposition of Divine wisdom. Some tolerant self-restraint, some wise distrust of one's own infallibility, some deference to the experience of the past—which is not

wholly worthless—with experience, hard thinking, and mutual coöperation may solve this problem. It is not more difficult than others which the human mind has solved.

President Eliot's method of solving the difficulty is simplicity itself. He banishes unity from college education and bows down before individuality. And the curious phase of the matter is, he fancies this is a solution. He cuts the knot by having the educator abdicate his pretended functions, and by committing the whole embarrassment to the individual student, who panoplied in "the sanctity of his gifts and will-power" casts it aside with the ease and grace of youth. The young man applying for an education is told to look out on the wide realm of learning, to him unknown and untrodden, and to elect his path. To do this with judgment and discrimination, he must know the end he wishes to reach; he must moreover know himself—his mental and moral characteristics, his aptitudes, his temperament, his tastes; and finally, he must know which of the numberless paths will lead him to the goal of his ambition, what combination of studies will open up the *Via Sacra* that leads to success. There are some restrictions, it is true, which hamper his election. For instance, he must avoid in his choice of studies any conflict between the hours appointed

for recitations and examination. He is "strongly urged to choose his studies with the utmost caution and under the best advice." But these provisions do not modify the general character of the system. He must distinctly understand that it is no longer the province of his Alma Mater to act as an earthly providence to him. Circumstances have obliged her to become a caterer. Each student is free to choose his own intellectual *pabulum*, and must assume in the main the direction of his own studies. If he solve the problem wisely, to him the profit; if unwisely, this same Alma Noverca disclaims the responsibility. The blame lies with himself, and for the present—until the elective system is introduced into our high schools—with those who had charge of his secondary education. If he is a careless student, having as yet no definite purpose to guide him, let him assume a purpose and reform. Is he not eighteen years of age?

This is the solution of the problem by the present elective system of Harvard. Now, the only question raised in this paper is: whether all educators are obliged to choose between this system and a prescribed system based on "direct revelation from on high;" whether a refusal to accept this system is "absurd and impossible." I am not, therefore, inquiring into its merits or demerits

except in so far as I am compelled to do so in defense of the Jesuit system. It may be, for all I now care, a makeshift, hopelessly adopted by those who were nonplussed by the intractable elements of the problem, or a step in the evolution of a plan devised for the elimination of the college from our American education. If there are any who are satisfied with it, to them the Jesuits have nothing to say beyond the words of St. Paul, "Let every man abound in his own sense." But they discount the implied challenge either to reject their system or to adduce "direct revelation from on high" in its favor.

The most persistent argument advanced in proof of the elective system is drawn from the individual differences of students. We sometimes hear Leibnitz quoted in this connection as having said that no two leaves of the same tree are alike. It may be doubted whether a man of Leibnitz's intellectual balance ever made such a lop-sided assertion. Any woodman could have told him that an oak leaf may be recognized at sight. This could not be done, if they were not similar. To fix one's eyes on accidental differences and close one's eyes to essential similitude would be an example of elective observation not creditable to a philosopher. It may seem trifling to insist on this truism, and in fact the

matter is trifling. But what other confusion is implied in the absolute certainty, that "no human wisdom is equal to contriving a prescribed course of study equally good for even two children of the same family, between the ages of eight and eighteen," except that which comes from emphasizing accidental differences and ignoring essential conformity? St. Thomas Aquinas holds that no two angels are in the same species. President Eliot comes perilously near predicating the same specific diversity of children. That boys vary in talents, in powers of application, in mental tendencies and aptitudes, is quite obvious; but we must also admit that they have intellectual faculties essentially similar, unless we are willing to maintain that they are kindred to the angels of Aquinas. Their specific unity is essential; their individual differences are accidental. All boys have those faculties by which they are scientifically classed as belonging to the genus *homo*; memory, powers of observation, of reasoning, of judgment, of imagination and of discrimination; though for native or wilful reasons they may not all be capable of equal culture.

A system of education which neglects either aspect of the subject is defective; and it is not evident that that is least defective which discards unity. The same arguments that are offered for

“electivism” in mental education will apply to “electivism” in physical training. Man is a unit mentally as well as physically. The exclusive and abnormal development of one side of his mind is as destructive of the “whole man, the polished man and the rounded man” when consequent on partial mental education as would be the specialized training of an athlete which neglected certain classes of muscles. Prior to specialization in athletics the wise director of a gymnasium will demand rounded physical development. The man whose whole education has been special or elective is as pitiable an object as a hollow-chested acrobat who can toss barrels with his feet. Both have undergone “training for power,” both have made a thorough study of a few things, but both will remain to the end of their days educational curiosities. If the elective system were applied to the visible and material, its absurdity would be instantly detected. Because the region of its application is supersensible it is foisted on us with a cloud of sophistry arising from a jumble of political economy and psychology. One wonders sometimes whether the reasons adduced in its favor were really premises by which convictions were formed, or merely arguments to shore up a foregone conclusion.

This is the fundamental ground on

which the Jesuit method is at variance with the system of elective studies in use at Harvard. That system of itself has no unity. No quantity of theory, no frequent profession of educational principles speculatively correct, can obscure the fact that in practice President Eliot has abandoned the doctrine of unity in education. The Jesuits hold that doctrine of prime importance in collegiate training and formation. The causes assigned as motives for its desertion are not of such evident cogency as to put the only excuse for loyalty to it in "a revelation from on high." Relying merely on the light of reason, its desertion universally in this country would in the judgment of the Jesuits be disastrous. It would tend to lower the standard of education, to lessen the intrinsic value of a college degree, to give one-sided formation, to unfit men for effective University work.

President Thwing, of the Western Reserve University, in a recent paper declares that the "bane of our educational system is *haphazardness* in the choice of studies." President Harper, of Chicago University, in his address at the inauguration of the new president of Brown University, is even more emphatic, characterizing our present educational system as chaotic. Other citations might be added from men of equal

standing in the world of education. Inevitably with haphazardness and chaos as notes of the system, the standard of education is going to depend on those who direct their own education. The present writer's experience does not cover the period "between the ages of eight and eighteen," but he does know from some years of observation, that between the ages of fourteen and twenty the average boy will work, like electricity, along the line of least resistance. And he is confident that his experience is not peculiar. To apply to their education, therefore, university methods applicable only to men of intellectual and moral maturity, before they are able to feel judiciously the relations of their studies to their life's purpose, must necessarily put to some extent the standard of education under their control, and almost wholly commit to them the character of their own formation.

Here I may notice the appeal that is made in behalf of this policy to the "sanctity of the individual's gifts and powers." "The greatest reverence is due to boys," cries the old Roman satirist, and who will dare gainsay it? But an abiding sense of that very reverence inspires the Jesuit educator with the belief, that it is an unhallowed thing to make the plastic souls and hearts and minds of those entrusted to their care

the subjects of untried, revolutionary and wholesale experiment. Precisely because they believe in the sanctity of the individual they will not admit the advisability of subjecting them—as though they were small quadrupeds—to novel experiments in educational laboratories. Because they know that the boy of to-day will be to-morrow the maker of his country's destiny, will fashion its future, will shape for good or ill the forces that will give it stability or bring it ruin, they have hesitated to announce a go-as-you-please program of studies and a haphazard and chaotic system of formation. Because they believe the soul of a boy a sacred thing destined for an eternal life hereafter, to be attained by a noble life here, they have recognized the delicacy and responsibility of their functions, and have been satisfied with a safer and more conservative advance. In this regard for the moral aspects of education, they do possess the note "ecclesiastical," which President Eliot finds significant. Fortunately, however, in this respect the Jesuit Colleges do not consort with the Moslem alone, but find themselves in the company of many excellent non-Catholic Colleges, in this country. It seems strange, and would be incredible had we not evidence, that any one professing to be an educator and acquainted with

human nature in its formative period, should in this century maintain with such dogmatic intensity the exclusive wisdom of permitting boys to elect the studies by which their manhood will be moulded.

The distinction between the functions of a college and a university has been so often, so fully, and so definitely exposed that it seems impertinent to call a reader's attention to it again. Yet recognized truths in the presence of active adversaries need reiteration. The elective system retains the distinction in name ; but has in the first place brushed aside all real distinction between them, and in the second, is by trend, if not by purpose, tending to eliminate the college from our American system. It was apparently to this President Hadley referred in his inauguration address, when he said : " I cannot believe that any one who has watched the working of the French or German system would desire to see it introduced into this country."

President Seth Low defines very clearly the distinction between a college and university in saying : " A college is conceived of as a place of liberal culture, a university as a place for specialization based upon liberal culture." The functions of a college, therefore, may be grouped under two heads : first, it gives that rounded and harmonious mental

development, which the word education etymologically signifies; and secondly it lays "a solid substructure in the whole mind and character for any superstructure of science, professional or special, also for the building up of moral life, civil and religious."*

The all important aim of a college should be to give such formation and information as will enable the student to choose his career in life, to elect, if need be, his profession or his specialty in the university. "Election should presuppose on the elector's part some knowledge of the subjects elected" is, I believe, the saying of one of Harvard's most cultured sons, assuredly one of her wise ones. To choose as an expert and not as an empiric one must have made experience of one's strength intelligently in many fields. A boy cannot safely trust his untried fancies, whims, or juvenile interests. The young lad of ten years of age, whose father is a banker, a writer, or a college president, will often find the life of a motorman or a horse-trainer an attraction. The boy of larger growth will be less immature in his choice of what appeals to him as an ideal life, but he will not be safer. He has not had the opportunity of knowing even remotely the contents of the several

* Boston College Catalogue, 1898-1899.

caskets which contain his true vocation. Like the luckless Morocco he may judge from exterior glitter, and thus frustrate his own life purpose, or curtail its usefulness.

The college, therefore, is distinct from the university in the mental and moral disciplines applied to the student. The college forms its ward, providing disciplines by which he may be developed into a man of the three Horatian dimensions; the university informs its members, offering courses of studies which presuppose not merely "training for power," but distinctively liberal culture. There may be electives in colleges, but they are from the very concept of a college incidental, collateral, and postulating previous advance. Electives constitute the intrinsic attribute of a university. The college undertakes to mould the character of the boy or half-man to habits of patient industry, of mental and moral temperance, and of wide intelligent interests. Its supervision over his moral life is as systematic as that over his mental life. By the constant exercise and concordant enlargement of many faculties, by an introduction to many sciences, by grounding in logic, in the general principles of philosophy, and in ethics, it preserves any one faculty in the formative period of life from so abnormally developing as to stunt or

atrophy others ; it widens the outlook, warding off the conceit and self-sufficiency of the boy specialist ;* it lays before him in large outline a map of the realm he may afterwards traverse in part and in detail, and it coördinates and relates his after specialty to other learning. A college is aware that a boy has idiosyncrasies as well as sanctities ; that by education these sanctities are brought out and the idiosyncrasies gently rubbed off and their wild exuberant growths pruned. The college is, therefore, in its method of teaching primarily tutorial, not professorial. The formation it proposes to give is not by accident in individual cases, but by design universally effected by personal and intimate relations between small groups of pupils and a teacher, whose duty comprehends guidance, advice, and encouragement, as well as instruction. Such a scheme of education gives the college student time and opportunity to study and compare his capacities and inclinations, and helps him to make a life decision which shall be founded on observation, experience,

* "There is no doubt that the tendency to specializing in our educational system, even from the beginning of the studies of youth, as contrasted with childhood, is excessive, and that if the best education is to continue, this tendency must be counteracted."—President Dwight, in his Report of 1899.

and reason. An opponent of this view would miss or confuse the scope of secondary and college education, if he argued that this system "has compelled the determination of the pupil's life destination at the early age of ten to fourteen." To recur to an illustration already used, the general training of an athlete in a gymnasium does not determine his after specialty, rather it manifests to him and his directors aptitudes and grounds for a discreet determination. The whole contention of this paper is summed up in a very apt metaphor of President Stryker, of Hamilton College. Contrasting the disciplines of a college and the investigations of a university, he says: "The processes have different conclusions. One should make iron into steel and the other make steel into tools. Specialization *not* 'based upon a liberal culture' attempts to put an edge on pot-iron."

The elective system of Harvard, carried into secondary schools and colleges to a logical and consistent issue, would be the application to education of the economic principle of the division of labor, which sinks the individual for the sake of the product. It might produce experts, but could not develop a man. We should have a crop of those specialists whom Oliver Wendell Holmes so genially portrays in his Breakfast Table series,

but the elective system would not give us a Holmes. We might have ministers, theologues, but we should not be indebted to the elective system for a Phillips Brooks. We might get from such a system educators, knowing books and the science and history of education; but we should scarcely get a Father Fulton, knowing boys and skilled in the art of education. Lawyers too it may produce, but scarcely a Rufus Choate; bankers, but not Stedmans; literary men skilled in the technique of their art, but with no horizon outside of their sphere. In a word:

“Knowledge comes, but wisdom lingers. . . .
And the individual withers, and the world is
more and more.”

In conclusion we submit with all due deference that President Eliot's reflections on Jesuit schools need recension. His declaration that the Jesuit curriculum has been marked by four hundred years of almost changeless uniformity is unfounded. His exaggerated statement that the method of Jesuit schools is justified only by “an unhesitating belief in the Divine Wisdom” of such a method is somewhat humorous, but not convincing. His implied challenge demanding either evidence of a “direct revelation from on high” as a basis of that method, or its rejection as “absurd and impossible” is a defective dilemma.

Why may not a body of men by the mere light of human reason be persuaded of the unwisdom of haphazardness and chaos, and the necessity of unity in college education without being challenged to show their credentials from on high? They must confess they have no such credentials. Then abandon your method and adopt my elective system, is President Eliot's implied inference. There is a *non-sequitur* here so surprising that perforce we are driven to surmise that behind this paralogism there is an esoteric reason for this attack which we have not discerned.

President Eliot's whole career heretofore forbids us to put any interpretation on it which would imply that he was even subconsciously motivated by unreasonable hostility. What inspired this criticism of Jesuit schools, therefore, we can not even conjecture. We can only await further enlightenment, assuring the President of Harvard that if he give reasons for his dislike of our methods they will always get that respectful consideration due them because of his position and personal worth.

TIMOTHY BROSNAHAN, S.J.

Woodstock, Md.

..... REPRINTED
FROM THE
SACRED HEART REVIEW ·
JANUARY 13, 1900

